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Abstract
In Belgium unemployment insurance bene¯ts can only exhaust for one cat-
egory of workers: partners of workers with (replacement) labour income
(mostly women) may loose their entitlement after an unemployment dura-
tion ranging from two to eight years, depending on individual characteristics.
We contrast three propensity score matching estimators of the impact of ben-
e¯t exhaustion on the probability of employment : a standard, a before-after
and an IV matching estimator. We conclude that bene¯t expiration is an-
ticipated as from the moment at which the worker is noti¯ed, three months
in advance, and that it gradually increases the employment rate up to 25
percentage points 14 months after bene¯t withdrawal.
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The Belgian Unemployment Insurance (UI) system is unique in the world in that
the receipt of unemployment bene¯ts (UB) is not limited in time. There is, how-
ever, an exception to this rule. For partners of workers with (replacement) labour
income (mostly women), bene¯ts may under some conditions expire beyond some
threshold unemployment duration. This paper aims at estimating the average
treatment e®ect of bene¯t exhaustion on the probability of employment for women
belonging to this group.1 For this purpose we use an existing database that was
constructed for evaluation purposes (see De Lathouwer et al. (2000)). It consists
of two samples. One is drawn from the °ow of UB recipients for whom bene¯ts
have expired between March and June 1997. The second sample is drawn from
the stock of long-term unemployed workers in March 1997 for whom the bene¯ts
were not yet withdrawn. The database combines survey and administrative in-
formation. It allows to construct the employment history of these workers from
63 months prior to the sample selection date to 14 months after. On the basis of
simple logit estimations, De Lathouwer et al. (2003) ¯nd that the scheme boosts
employment rates by 14 percentage points 3 months after bene¯t expiration, de-
creasing to 9 percentage points after 15 months. These e®ects are signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero at the 95% level of signi¯cance. Our paper veri¯es whether
these results uphold if one uses evaluation methods that require less restrictive
identifying assumptions.
Job search theory predicts that bene¯t exhaustion generates three e®ects (see
Mortensen (1977, 1990), van den Berg (1990), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003b)
for a survey). The two ¯rst e®ects realise ex post, once the entitlement has expired.
First, as the worker has an interest in maintaining her living standard, the absence
of unemployment bene¯ts enhances incentives to search for and to accept jobs.
Second, since the worker is no longer eligible, she has an additional interest in
1Men were not retained, since they form a too small subsample of treated workers to perform
any sensible statistical analysis.
1being hired and in remaining employed until she can re-qualify for UB 2. Thirdly,
since the moment at which one ¯nds a job is not deterministic 3, workers will alter
their behaviour well in advance of the UB exhaustion. To the extent that workers
are aware of future bene¯t exhaustion, they anticipate this event by starting to
search for a job beforehand as to preclude the income loss in the event that a
job is not timely found. Theory predicts that this anticipation will gradually
increase the employment hazard as one approaches the expiration date. However,
if initially workers are unaware of the ¯nite entitlement length, the employment
hazard will jump upwards from the point at which they become informed and
subsequently increase gradually as for the informed workers. Due to the lack of
transparency of the Belgian scheme, we argue below that the latter case applies:
the behaviour will only change as from the moment at which the (unemployed)
worker is noti¯ed by the Unemployment Agency (UA). This occurs roughly three
months before bene¯t exhaustion.
There exists a vast empirical literature that tries to test these theoretical pre-
dictions. Devine and Kiefer (1991), Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), Layard
et al. (1991), and more recently, Holmlund (1998), Pedersen and Westergº ard{
Nielsen (1998) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003a) survey this literature. The
¯rst generation of studies, realised both in the US and in Europe between the
seventies and the early 1990s, generally con¯rm the predictions of the theoretical
model, but impacts are generally quite modest. Layard et al. (1991) state that
"the basic result of these studies is that the elasticity of expected duration with
respect to bene¯ts is generally relatively low, situated in a range between 0.2 and
0.9". The problem with this earlier literature is that, due to methodological °aws,
the estimations cannot always be interpreted as the true causal e®ect of a variation
in the unemployment compensation.4 The last ten years the evaluation literature
has evolved enormously and generally performs much more careful analysis in this
2Note that this e®ect disappears once the worker has completed the qualifying period.
3Note that this may not be true if the worker is recalled by his previous employer, see e.g.
Katz and Meyer (1990).
4See also Abbring et al. (2000, p.26{27) on this point.
2respect. Remarkably, the more recent (European) studies (Dormont et al. (2001)
for France, Carling et al. (2001) for Sweden and Roed and Zhang (2003) for Nor-
way)5 seem to ¯nd a much larger impact of UB on the unemployment duration
with elasticities ranging between 0.95 and 1.6.
Another strand of the empirical literature studies the impact of bene¯t ex-
haustion on the pro¯le of the hazard rate to employment as well as the impact
of variation in the length of entitlement period. These studies tend to support
the last mentioned ¯ndings in that impacts are generally found to be important
and consistent with job search theory. Almost every study 6 reports increases of
the job ¯nding rate as bene¯t exhaustion is approached (Wurzel (1990); Linde-
boom and Theeuwes (1993); Carling et al. (1996); Joutard and Ruggiero (1996);
Thoursie (1998); Bratberg and Vaage (2000); Dormont et al. (2001); Roed and
Zhang (2003)). Moreover, all studies ¯nd that the extension of the entitlement
duration signi¯cantly reduces the rate at which unemployment is left for employ-
ment (Mo±t (1985); Ham and Rea (1987); Katz and Meyer (1990); Hunt (1995);
Winter-Ebmer (1998); Card and Levine (2000); Lalive and ZweimÄ uller (2002)).
A ¯nal piece of evidence, suggesting that monetary incentives matter, comes
from the sparse evidence of the impact of UB sanctions on the employment hazard.
Sanctions are punitive bene¯t reductions that are used to enforce compliance of
UB claimants to job search requirements. An important feature of a sanction is
the bene¯t reduction itself. In that sense e®ects of sanctions indirectly provide
evidence for the e®ects of bene¯t reductions. However, one should be careful
with this interpretation : "the monitoring and sanctioning regime itself can be
expected to a®ect individual behavior, and the incentives to comply with the rules
may increase as the regime is typically tightened after a violation of the rules"
(Abbring et al., 2000, p.3). Nevertheless, the bene¯t cut undoubtedly represents
a signi¯cant component of the impact of a sanction and can be considered as a
5Neither Jenkins and Garcia-Serrano (2000) or Bover et al. (2002) seem to ¯nd large elasticities
for Spain, however.
6Again the study of Jenkins and Garcia-Serrano (2000) is an exception in that the employment
hazard in Spain does virtually not change as one approaches bene¯t expiration.
3useful complementary evidence. Abbring et al. (2000) ¯nd very large impacts
of sanctions in the Unemployment Insurance Scheme in the Netherlands. The
implied absolute values of the elasticities of the employment hazards with respect
to the bene¯t levels would range between 2 and 5. Van den Berg et al. (2004) ¯nd
similar results for sanctions on transitions from welfare to work. Finally, Lalive
et al. (2002) and Jensen et al. (2003) ¯nd also quantitatively important e®ects of
bene¯t sanctions in respectively the Swiss and Danish UB scheme.
Our paper contributes to this literature by providing a new estimate of the
impact of bene¯t exhaustion on the basis of modern evaluation methods (See
e.g. Heckman et al. (1999), Blundell and Costa-Dias (2002)). As to enhance the
credibility of our ¯ndings, we estimate the impact on the basis of three di®erent
methods: a standard, a before-after and an Instrumental Variables (IV) propensity
score matching estimator. Since all three methods are based on matching, they
are not sensitive to functional form or parametric assumptions and they take care
of individual heterogeneity in the treatment e®ect of the treated.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we brie°y describe the system
of bene¯t exhaustion in the Belgian UI scheme. In Section 3, we describe the
database used in our study. Section 4 explains the estimation methods and results.
A last section concludes.
2 Bene¯t Exhaustion in Belgium
As in most European countries, in Belgium workers qualify for UI after involuntary
redundancy if their record of salaried employment is su±ciently long.7 However,
unlike in most countries, once workers qualify for UI in Belgium, if they are "avail-
able for the labour market" and if they comply to certain administrative rules,
they are entitled to bene¯ts for an inde¯nite period. There is only one exception
to this rule: bene¯ts may be withdrawn after an unemployment duration, ranging
7One particularity of the Belgian system is that school-leavers are also entitled, after some
waiting period.
4from two to eight years, if one is less than 50 years old and partner of someone
with a (replacement) income exceeding a particular level.8 The precise value un-
employment duration at which bene¯ts exhaust depends on the age class (3), the
region of residence (30) and the gender of the unemployed person9. The thresholds
are calculated as 1.5 times the average unemployment duration for each class , as
measured at a certain point in the past.10 From Table 1, one can deduce that these
durations are quite heterogenous across and within age classes.
For the subsequent analysis it is crucial to realise that unemployment duration
is not measured according to the standard "ILO" or "EUROSTAT" de¯nitions.
The counter accumulates any day of unemployment since the ¯rst entry, days of
part-time (un)employment being weighted appropriately. It is only reset to zero
if there is a period of at least two years of full-time employment between two
subsequent unemployment spells. It is not a®ected by temporary interruptions of
unemployment.
[Table 1 about here]
An unemployed worker is noti¯ed not later than three months before the poten-
tial bene¯t exhaustion, i.e. the date at which the unemployment duration crosses
the threshold. From that moment onwards, one may appeal against that decision
on the following grounds. (1) If the annual net taxable family income (exclud-
ing the bene¯t) is below a certain threshold. In January 2003, this threshold was
16,750 EUR, i.e. roughly 140% of the minimum wage, augmented by 670 EUR, for
each dependant person of the household. (2) If the unemployed worker can prove
"an exceptional and continuous job search e®ort throughout the unemployment
8For this category of workers the unemployment bene¯t is degressive, decreasing in three
phases: it starts at a replacement rate of 55% during the ¯rst 12 months (with a °oor and a
ceiling of respectively 540 EUR and 920 EUR in January 2004), falling to 40% (within the range
of 540-670 EUR) during the next three months (possibly longer according to the employment
experience) and ¯nally falls to a °at rate level (380 EUR in January 2004). Bene¯t exhaustion
always occurs in the last phase.
9Thus, there are 3 ¤ 30 ¤ 2 = 180 di®erent thresholds.
10At which point in time these unemployment durations were calculated is unclear. It is clear,
however, that they haven't been updated for a long time.
5spell". (3) If the unemployed worker is participating in an active labour market
policy. (4) If the unemployed worker can prove a substantial degree of disability.
If the appeal is justi¯ed, bene¯t exhaustion is postponed de¯nitely or temporarily,
for a de¯ned or unde¯ned time period. As consequence, between 1991 and 2003
only roughly 40% of those noti¯ed had their bene¯ts e®ectively withdrawn. In
1997, this concerned slightly less than 19,000 individuals or roughly 4% of the
total number of bene¯t recipients during that year.
Once bene¯ts are withdrawn, the worker can re-qualify in one of the three
following cases : (1) the worker separates from his/her partner; (2) the yearly
net taxable income drops below a lower threshold (in January 2003 14,795 EUR
plus 670 EUR per additional dependant person); (3) proof of 312 days of full time
employment over an uninterrupted period of 18 months is delivered. As opposed
to other countries, there is no unemployment assistance scheme that sets in when
bene¯ts exhaust. In principle, the individuals can claim means-tested welfare
assistance. However, since only workers with family income above some threshold
can loose UI bene¯ts, this only very rarely occurs 11: within the sample analysed
in this paper only 0.3% claimed welfare bene¯ts within the ¯rst 4 months following
the expiration (De Lathouwer et al., 2003, p.91).
From this description it is clear that the rules pertaining to bene¯t exhaustion
are complex. Indeed, the precise moment of bene¯t exhaustion depends on a
number of criteria that may vary over time: partner-status, place of residence,
family income, age, etc. Moreover, for workers with irregular employment histories
it is rather di±cult to keep track of their e®ective elapsed unemployment duration.
We therefore claim that it is unlikely that workers anticipate the bene¯t exhaustion
before being noti¯ed. This claim cannot be rejected on the basis of the empirical
analysis below.
11e.g. if there is a recent drop in family income that is not captured by the past annual net
taxable income.
63 Data
The analysis is based on an existing database that was constructed for the purpose
of evaluating the bene¯t exhaustion scheme (see De Lathouwer et al. (2000)). The
structure of this database is rather complex. So as to facilitate the explanation,
we summarised its features in Figure 1. The database consists of two samples of
unemployed workers. Since in both samples the workers are less than 50 years old
and cohabiting with a partner earning some (replacement) labour income, bene¯ts
can potentially expire for both groups. The ¯rst sample, the treatment group,
contains 1,506 individuals and is randomly drawn from the °ow of UI recipients
for whom bene¯ts e®ectively expired between March and June 1997. The second
sample, the control group, contains 1,205 individuals and is drawn from the stock
of "long-term" 12 unemployed workers in March 1997 from whom the bene¯ts were
not yet withdrawn.
[Figure 1 about here]
We imposed three additional sample selection criteria. First, even if the re-
sponse rate at the survey date was fairly high (66% for the treatment group and
73% for the control group), it was not complete. In the analysis we do not ac-
count for the potential selection bias on unobserved characteristics induced by
non-response. There is, however, no reason for serious concern, since no signi¯cant
selection could be detected on the basis of the observed individual characteristics
(see De Lathouwer et al. (2000) for details). Second, since only few partners of un-
employed men earn a (replacement) labour income, men are a too small sub-sample
(169 among the treated respondents and 196 among the controls) to perform a sen-
sible statistical analysis. Only women are therefore retained. Thirdly, we excluded
188 "polluted controls" (=27% of the female respondents in the control group).
These refer to workers whose bene¯ts were not yet suspended at the sampling date
12"Long-term" means here that the worker has experienced unemployment - possibly with
interruptions - during more than 18 months since January 1992.
7in March 1997, but for whom one of the three following events occurred between
the sampling and the survey date: (1) they were noti¯ed, but bene¯ts did not
(yet) exhaust; (2) they were noti¯ed and bene¯ts expired e®ectively; (3) bene¯ts
were withdrawn for another reason (e.g.: refusing a job o®er, misrepresentation of
household composition as to obtain higher bene¯ts,...). The survey allows to iden-
tify these individuals, but, unfortunately, does not inform on the date at which
the above-mentioned events occurred. After imposing these selection criteria, we
retain 826 women in the treatment group and 404 in the control group.
Both samples were drawn from administrative ¯les on UI recipients. These
contain information on individual characteristics (the age, an indicator for the
Belgian nationality, the highest level of education attained and the sub-region of
residence) and on unemployment histories during up to 63 months prior to the
sample selection date. The administrative information was completed by responses
to a survey conducted at one point in time between September 1998 and May
1999.13 The reported number of children in the household at the survey date
was the only additional individual characteristic retained. Besides, the survey
respondents reported their monthly labour market status between January 1997
and the date of the survey.
The data contain three major de¯ciencies for our purposes. First, there is a
break in the series regarding the labour market histories, since it comes from two
sources: prior to the sampling date from the administrative source and afterwards
from the survey. Second, they do not contain a variable that de¯nes unemployment
duration in exactly the same way as the administrative rules regarding bene¯t
expiration. Thirdly, the data do not inform at which moment unemployed women
are noti¯ed of the bene¯t exhaustion.
As to the last de¯ciency, we only know that the rules impose that the unem-
ployed workers must be noti¯ed not later than 3 months before bene¯ts expire.
In the sequel we simply assume that it occurs at that moment. The ¯rst two
13The large discrepancy between the starting and the ending date of the survey was a conse-
quence of some budgetary problems as explained in De Lathouwer et al. (2000).
8de¯ciencies are addressed di®erently according to the statistical method applied
to the data. The benchmark "before-after" method described in the next section
only analyzes the treatment sample. For this group, we assume that the e®ective
elapsed duration at the moment of expiration coincides with the theoretical thresh-
old duration at which bene¯ts should be withdrawn according to the rules. The
elapsed duration prior to bene¯t exhaustion is then calculated backwards starting
from the date of bene¯t withdrawal on the basis of the 63 monthly administrative
information regarding the number of days of bene¯t receipt. After the expiration
date, one month of unemployment duration is added for each month the female
workers reported to be unemployed or inactive according to the monthly labour
market status of the survey's questionnaire.
In the causal analysis below the monthly employment status 14 is the outcome
variable. After January 1997, the monthly employment status corresponds to
the one reported by survey respondents at the time of the interview. However,
the "before-after" estimator requires information prior to this date. We therefore
construct a series predicted on the basis of an estimated relationship between
the monthly employment status reported in the survey and the number of days
unemployed every month according to the administrative ¯les. Such an estimation
is possible, since there is a period of overlap between January 1997 and June 1997,
during which information of both sources is available. Details of the estimation
can be found in Appendix A.
For the other statistical methods discussed in section 4.2, the above-mentioned
data problems are resolved di®erently. First, we estimate the impact of bene¯t
exhaustion only as from the moment at which bene¯ts are withdrawn and not
before. As a consequence, the outcome variable can be exclusively based on the
employment histories reported in the survey. Second, we cannot follow the same
procedure as to de¯ne the elapsed unemployment duration, since for the control
sample the date of e®ective bene¯t exhaustion is unknown. We use two com-
14We do not distinguish between full- and part-time.
9plementary notions of unemployment duration: the cumulative number of days
(as expressed in months) of UI entitlement up to 63 months before the sample
selection date and the duration of the last UI spell.15 An indicator identi¯es left
censored spells.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the retained control and treatment
sample. It turns out that the treated individuals are on average younger than the
controls, slightly better educated, and have on average more dependant children in
their households. As far as the labour market histories are concerned, the treated
have a higher cumulated unemployment duration than the controls, and their last
unemployment spell is substantially longer. The average local unemployment rate
in the sub-region of residence is very close for both groups.
[Table 2 about here]
4 The Impact of Bene¯t Exhaustion on the Employ-
ment Rate
This paper aims at providing an estimate of bene¯t exhaustion on the women
retained in the above-mentioned treatment sample. As to enhance the credibility
of our ¯ndings, we estimate the impact on the basis of di®erent methods and
contrast the results. A common thread in these methods is that they will all be
based on propensity score matching methods. As such our estimation methods do
not require functional form or parametric assumptions and take care of individual
heterogeneity in the treatment e®ect of the treated.
The standard cross section matching method requires an assumption of un-
confoundedness or "selection on observables" (see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983);
Heckman et al. (1997, 1998); Dehejia and Wahba (1999); Imbens (2003) for a re-
cent review). Since in many applications, as for the one presented in this paper,
15A spell was interrupted if the individual did not receive any unemployment bene¯ts during
at least one calendar month
10this assumption is overly restrictive, one calls for the use of di®erence-in-di®erences
(DD) matching estimators to eliminate any remaining ¯xed unobserved bias term
(Heckman et al. (1997) ; Smith and Todd (2004)). Nevertheless, we do not imple-
ment a DD estimator in the present application, but rather a simple before-after
estimator, be it on an unusual time-scale. We justify this choice below.
One may be suspicious of the validity of the before-after estimator since it
requires the strong identifying assumption that all systematic time-varying e®ects
can be captured by a number of observed time-varying variables. In a sensitivity
analysis we therefore contrast the ¯ndings of the benchmark before-after estimator
to two alternative estimators : a standard matching and an IV estimator. Note,
since we have a discrete outcome variable, Two Stage Least Squares will in general
yield inconsistent estimates (see e.g. Wooldridge (2002, p.478)). We avoid this
problem by implementing the IV estimator as a matching estimator (Heckman
et al. (1999); Ichimura and Taber (2001)).
4.1 The Benchmark Model : The Before{After Estimator
4.1.1 A Preliminary Analysis
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the employment rate (of the women) in the
treatment group. Calendar time is normalised to zero in the month that bene¯ts
exhaust, i.e. between March and June 1997. The time scale runs from 62 calendar
months before the expiration date to 14 months afterwards.16 The employment
rate evolves according to a U-shaped pattern. Starting at a level of 24% at -62 it
falls steadily to 11% at -11 months. Thereafter it increases continuously up to a
level of 26% at the end of the observation period.
[Figure 2 about here]
16The survey response period starts in September 1998. This is 14 months after expiration for
those women whose bene¯ts were withdrawn in June 1997. Beyond 14 months we therefore no
longer observe the employment status of all women.
11One might be tempted to interpret this graph as proof for the presence of a
temporary "Ashenfelter-dip" in the employment rate (Ashenfelter, 1978). Alter-
natively, one may want to interpret the initial decrease as "permanent", induced
by an unemployment dependency e®ect and the reversal of this evolution at -11
as an anticipated behavioural impact of the bene¯t exhaustion that sets in well
in advance of the moment at which women are noti¯ed, three months beforehand.
Neither of these interpretations is, however, correct. The observed pattern is the
consequence of an incorrect time-scale prior to the expiration date.
Workers are noti¯ed three months of bene¯t entitlement prior to the expiration
date. This corresponds to three months of calendar time only if workers don't
leave unemployment during these last months of entitlement. However, in general
workers may interrupt their unemployment spell temporarily. As already stated
(see Section 2), this interruption only stops the counter of unemployment duration,
but does not set it to zero. Consequently, one month of UI entitlement may cover
a much longer calendar time period.
In Figure 3, the evolution of the employment rate is plotted as a function of
entitlement months prior to the expiration month and of calendar months after-
wards. With this new time scale the employment rate is no longer clearly de¯ned,
since one month of entitlement may span several calendar months. We propose to
de¯ne the employment status of a treated woman as the average employment rate
over the calendar months during which the bene¯t entitlement duration remains
constant.17
The plotted employment rates in Figure 3 are averages of this employment
indicator over the treatment sample. Note that with this new time scale we cannot
go as far back in time, since each month of bene¯t eligibility may correspond to
several calendar months. In fact the sample is incomplete prior to 4 entitlement
months before bene¯t exhaustion. This means that at least one woman has not
been paid bene¯ts during at least 63 months within the 4 last months that she
17The entitlement duration is rounded o® up to the nearest month.
12was entitled to UI. The employment rate prior to this date is therefore based on
an incomplete sample gradually decreasing in size. 18
[Figure 3 about here]
The ¯gure reveals that the evolution over this new time-scale of the employ-
ment rate is completely di®erent. The employment rate is now roughly constant
until -4. Three months prior to bene¯t expiration, i.e. roughly at the moment at
which the unemployed woman is noti¯ed, the employment rate suddenly starts to
increase. It rises most steeply one month prior to the month in which bene¯ts are
withdrawn.
Figure 3 provides unambiguous evidence of a positive causal impact of bene-
¯t exhaustion on the employment rate: the increase of the employment rate one
month prior to the exhaustion is too abrupt to be credibly explained by other
time-varying factors, such as labour market conditions, unemployment duration
or life-cycle events. To estimate the quantitative magnitude of this impact we
nevertheless need to purge the gross impact of these time-varying factors, in par-
ticular if we wish to estimate the long-term impact, for instance 14 months later.
We propose a purging method in the next subsection.
Figure 3 also proves that the bene¯t exhaustion is anticipated. As a conse-
quence, the impact as estimated on the available sample is necessarily a lower
bound: women who manage to escape bene¯t exhaustion, for instance by timely
¯nding a full-time job lasting more than two years, are not retained in the treat-
ment sample. We need other data to gauge the importance of this anticipation
e®ect.
4.1.2 Methods to Control for Time-Varying Variables
The analysis of the preceding section suggests that, if applied on the modi¯ed
time-scale, two necessary identifying conditions of a before-after estimator are
18This sample size is reported up to -13 in Table 3 in the following sub-section. Complete
information is available upon request.
13satis¯ed in this empirical application. First, the beginning of the treatment period
is clearly identi¯ed at three months of bene¯t entitlement before the expiration
date. Second, on the modi¯ed time-scale, the outcome variable does not display
any longer a temporary "Ashenfelter dip" prior to the start of the treatment.
Nevertheless, a before-after estimator is only an unbiased estimator of the
impact to the extent that it purges the outcome variable of other time-varying
determinants. The DD estimator is a popular solution to this problem. We do not
apply this method in our application for several reasons. First, the DD estima-
tor requires that the bias between control and treatment group remains constant
(Eichler and Lechner, 2002). However, it is not clear how this constancy can be
guaranteed in a "nonlinear environment": even if the bias is induced by ¯xed
determinants, the non-linear transformation of this ¯xed term evaluated at two
di®erent time points is generally no longer ¯xed. Since the outcome variable is
(partly) discrete in our empirical application, this critique applies.19 Blundell
et al. (2001) solve this problem by assuming that a nonlinear transformation (e.g.
the inverse logistic) of the expected outcome variable can eliminate the bias. How-
ever, it is not clear which is the appropriate choice of this transformation function
and how to generalise this to more than two outcomes (Athey and Imbens, 2002,
p.24).
There is an additional reason why we do not implement DD. On the basis
of the modi¯ed time-scale a DD estimator is no longer feasible. The reason is
twofold. First, the data on control units only contain imperfect information on
the entitlement duration left until expiration (see Section 3). Second, even if we
had this information, these units would no longer be controls, since if they are
measured at the same moment as the treated according to this new time scale,
their bene¯ts would exhaust at the same moment as for the treated.20
19In the empirical analysis the outcome variable is the employment status as de¯ned according
to de¯nition 1 in the previous section. Since this variable is an average, it is only partly discrete.
20This could be avoided if one constructed a hypothetical threshold duration for a group of
women who are never eligible to the treatment, e.g. singles or women cohabiting with a partner
without (replacement) income of employment. However, these data were not available.
14We therefore control for time-varying variables in a di®erent way. We assume
that there are essentially two important time-varying determinants of the em-
ployment rate: the state of the local labour market and the elapsed cumulative
unemployment duration.21 We believe that other factors, such as those pertaining
to the life-cycle, a®ect the population randomly at the di®erent time periods, so
that they average out.
One may question whether it is appropriate to control for the unemployment
duration at the time of treatment. For, the observed unemployment duration after
treatment is lower than the counterfactual unemployment duration in the absence
of treatment: if bene¯t exhaustion enhances the time spent in employment, then
the cumulative unemployment duration increases less than if bene¯ts did not ex-
pire. In principle, we should therefore condition in the after treatment period on
this higher counterfactual duration, but we cannot, since it is unobserved. By this
neglect we under-estimate the impact of bene¯t exhaustion on the employment
rate. As this indirect impact grows over time, this bias will increase with k. How-
ever, this bias cannot be large. To obtain some sense for the order of magnitude we
estimated the treatment e®ect excluding the unemployment duration as a control.
This reduces the impact estimate at k = 14 by about 1.5 percentage points.
We can control for these time-varying variables in two ways. The ¯rst method
is described in Heckman et al. (1999, p.1985) in which the outcome variable is
adjusted by some function of the time-varying variables. In principle, one could
estimate this function non{parametrically, but this may not be easy, especially
if the outcome variable is discrete.22 We therefore propose an alternative non-
parametric procedure. This adjusts the outcome variable at each moment by a
method of matching on the propensity score of the time-varying variables. A
21The ¯rst is captured by the sub-regional unemployment rate for women as reported by the
National Administration of UI (ONEM/RVA). The second is captured by the cumulative (possibly
interrupted) unemployment duration. These variables are evaluated at the ¯rst calendar month
of a period in which the duration of remaining bene¯t eligibility remains constant.
22In Appendix E we describe this method and apply it on the basis of a linear adjustment
function. The linear speci¯cation is rejected on the pre-sample data, but for this application the
impact estimates do not di®er much from the proposed non-parametric procedure.
15drawback of the method is that a common support problem is bound to occur.
We solve this problem by implementing the method as a sum of "incremental"
matching estimators applied to subperiods of the period under consideration.
For a formal analysis, we introduce some notation. First note that the variables
below are all de¯ned for women belonging to the treatment sample. To avoid
burdensome notation, we ignore everywhere the reference to these individuals,
usually denoted by a subscript i.
Let k denote time according to the modi¯ed scale: if k is negative it means
that jkj months of entitlement are left until bene¯ts exhaust; a positive k refers to
the number of calendar months after the expiration. D is an indicator equal to one
if the individual is "treated" and to zero "otherwise". "Treated" means that one
is informed of the remaining entitlement duration or that bene¯ts have e®ectively
been withdrawn. We assume that treatment starts when the unemployed worker
is noti¯ed, i.e. at k = k¤, and that k¤ = ¡3. The latter assumption can be tested,
as shown below.
Y1k and Y0k denote the potential outcomes of respectively being treated or not
at time k. The observed outcome Yk is then de¯ned as:
Yk ´ DY1k + (1 ¡ D)Y0k (1)
We aim at estimating the Average Treatment E®ect on the Treated at time k:
ATTk ´ E(Y1k ¡ Y0kjD = 1) (2)
To control for time-varying determinants of the employment rate, we now
propose a non-parametric procedure based on propensity score matching. We
consider two alternatives: "direct" and "incremental" matching.
16Direct Matching
In order to identify the ATTk according to this method, we need some assumptions.
First, we assume that the treatment status may not systematically a®ect the
potential no-treatment outcome given some realisation the observed time-varying
variables:
Assumption 1 8k0 < k¤;8xk0 :
E(Y0k0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk0) = E(Y0k0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk0)
This assumption means that in the pre-treatment period the treatment indica-
tor may not systematically a®ect the potential no-treatment outcome. As such, we
can replace the average potential outcome of the treated E(Y0k0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk0)
by the average observed adjusted outcome of the same women prior to treat-
ment E(Y0k0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk0). Since the expectations are taken over the same
group of individuals, the assumption can only be violated if there is an unobserved
determinant of the outcome variable that systematically changes simultaneously
with the treatment status. This is very unlikely to occur in the current empirical
application.
Second, we assume that, conditional on a realisation of the observed time-
varying variables, the potential no-treatment outcome for the treated does not
systematically vary over time:
Assumption 2 8k;k0;xk : E(Y0kjD = 1;Xk = xk) = E(Y0k0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk)
This assumption means that for every realisation of the time-varying variables,
xk, the distribution of unobserved determinants of the outcome variable is constant
over time. This assumption is violated if xk does not capture all time variation
or if the composition of a sub-sample with a particular realisation of xk changes
over time. The ¯rst type of violation can be, for instance, induced by a policy
change after a particular date. A violation of the second type can be the result of a
17movement from a an economic downturn to an economic upturn. If one conditions
on a high local unemployment rate, in a downturn the sub-sample of unemployed
workers may contain a much larger share of quali¯ed workers than in an upturn.23
Finally, we must make a common support assumption (see e.g. Lechner (2001)):
Assumption 3 8 k ; 8 xk ; 9 k0 < k¤ : Prob(Xk0 = xk) 6= 0
This means that, for every realised values xk of the vector of time-varying vari-
ables in treatment month k, there must in principle exist an identical realisation
in month k0 in the pre-treatment period.24 This is required to ¯nd a control unit
for each realised treatment. The larger the interval between the treatment and
the pre-treatment period, the more likely this assumption is violated. In fact, we
report below that for the present empirical application there is a substantial com-
mon support problem. As a consequence, we can not estimate the causal impact
of bene¯t exhaustion of a large share (30%) of the treated women. This neglect
could seriously bias the estimator ATTk of the total treated population. This is
why we will propose a variant of the method { "incremental matching" { that
recovers the causal impact for the excluded treated units.
The following two propositions summarise how the Assumptions 1 and 2 imply
testable outcomes in the pre-treatment period on the one hand and how they
identify ATTk on the basis of a matching estimator on the other hand.
Proposition 1 25 If Assumptions 1-3 hold then: 8 k0 < k¤;8 xk¤¡1 :
E[E(Yk0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk¤¡1) ¡ E[Yk¤¡1jD = 0;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤¡1)jD = 0] = 0
Thus, conditional on the time-varying factors, the outcome variable may on aver-
age not vary in the pre-treatment period. If Proposition 1 cannot be statistically
23In the empirical application we do not only condition on the unemployment rate, but also
on the unemployment duration. Since the latter variable is likely to be correlated with the level
of quali¯cation, this may mitigate the problem.
24The literature usually states this assumption as follows:
Prob(D = 1jD = 0 or D = 1;xk) < 1.
25see Appendix B for a proof.
18rejected, this provides support for the hypothesis that the before-after estimator
indeed identi¯es the causal impact of the treatment. It is no proof, however. 26
Proposition 2 27 If Assumptions 1-3 hold then: 8 k ¸ k¤; 9 k0 < k¤ :
ATTk = E[E(YkjD = 1;Xk = xk) ¡ E(Yk0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk)jD = 1]
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of XkjD = 1
This proposition states that we can estimate the impact by matching each
treated woman to a woman who has not yet been treated, but who has the same
realisation of the time-varying variables. If these variables take on discrete values,
one can match directly on each realisation of the time-varying variables. Alterna-
tively, we can use the results of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to justify matching
on the propensity score.
Incremental Matching
We mentioned that, as a consequence of lack of common support, the direct match-
ing method may not be very appealing. This is why we propose a variant that
eliminates the problem, be it at the cost of reducing the precision of the estimator.
In a nutshell, incremental matching consists in taking the sum of the impacts of
moving, incrementally, from one time period to the next. If we consider a su±-
cient number of increments, this sum measures the impact of a treatment at some
moment substantially beyond the start of the treatment. The common support
problem is avoided if the conditioning variables vary only gradually, since one
must only apply matching sequentially for adjacent time periods in stead of once
for periods that far o®. We relax Assumption 3 in the following way:
Assumption 4 8 k;8 xk : Prob(Xk¡1 = xk) 6= 0
26See Heckman and Hotz (1989) for a discussion.
27see Appendix B for a proof.
19We therefore only require that, for any realisation xk at time k, we can ¯nd
with a strictly positive probability the same realisation in the preceding month
k ¡ 1. If satis¯ed together with Assumptions 1 and 2, the following proposition
shows how one can identify ATTk.28




E [E(YjjD = 1;Xj = xj) ¡ E(Yj¡1jD = 1;Xj¡1 = xj)jD = 1]+
E [E(Yk¤jD = 1;Xk¤ = xk¤) ¡ E(Yk¤¡1jD = 0;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤)jD = 1]
The proposition suggests estimating ATTk by a sum of incremental impacts in
the successive periods between the start of the treatment period and the moment
k at which the eventual (cumulative) impact is evaluated. However, since the
outcome variable is in general positively serially correlated, this procedure will
come at the cost of in°ating the standard error of the estimated impact.30 We
therefore apply the procedure of incremental matching only if necessary, i.e. on
the treated observations outside the region of common support if direct matching
is applied. Moreover, we reduce the number of terms in the sum by grouping time
periods up to the point that the problem of common support shows up.
Implementation and Results of the Direct and Incremental Matching
Estimators
[Table 3 about here]
We ¯rst explain the benchmark propensity score matching method that we
apply in this section. Subsequently, we discuss how the test for the absence of
28In the empirical application we need not relax Proposition 1.
29see Appendix B for a proof.
30In the empirical application we estimate this standard error by bootstrapping.
20any impact in the pre-treatment period performs on the basis of a direct matching
estimator. We then focus on a number of problems and choices to be made in the
estimation of the ATTk for k = 14. On the basis of this discussion we select a
method of estimation that we implement to estimate the ATTk for k 2 [¡3;14].
The propensity scores are estimated using a procedure proposed by Dehejia
and Wahba (2002) 31. This procedure aims at ¯nding the correct speci¯cation
of the propensity score that satis¯es the "balancing property" (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983). Once the propensity score is estimated, we must select a matching
algorithm. We choose "blocking" in which the matching occurs over a number of
blocks into which the support of the estimated propensity score has been divided
(see e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) and Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002)).32
The same blocks, as those used for the speci¯cation test of the propensity score can
be used. The standard error of ATTk is calculated by a non-parametric bootstrap.
Before turning to the estimates of the average treatment e®ects, we discuss the
results of the testable implications of our assumptions as formalised in Proposition
1: the pre-treatment outcomes may not di®er over time. We contrast the outcome
at k = ¡4 to those in the interval [¡13;¡5]. Again note that the sample size
(N = 826) gradually decreases from 825 to 814. We do not go beyond k = ¡13,
since the sample size reduces more quickly after that point: this may invalidate
the test. The ¯ndings are reported in Table 3. In any period, the impact e®ect
are rather small. Furthermore, it turns out that no impact e®ect is signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero at a 5% level.
We now turn to the estimation of the treatment e®ects. We ¯rst tried to
estimate ATT14 by directly matching observations at k = 14 with those in the
pre-treatment period at k = ¡4. On the basis of the above-mentioned benchmark
31see appendix C for a description.
32We contrasted the blocking algorithm to an Epanechnikov kernel matching estimator (see
Heckman et al., 1998) for two choices of the smoothing parameter. The point estimates (readily
available on request) are slightly lower, but not signi¯cantly di®erent from those reported below.
This con¯rms the general observation that estimates are not very sensitive to the speci¯c choice
of the matching algorithm.
21procedure we could not ¯nd any balanced speci¯cation of the propensity score. 33
We suspect that this failure is the consequence of the true speci¯cation not being
su±ciently smooth to be captured by a logit transformation of a polynomial in the
continuously valued explanatory variables. If the propensity score varies abruptly
in regions that lack common support, a propensity score that is a function of
continuously valued variables cannot be balanced in these regions. We therefore
devised a procedure in which we categorize the explanatory variables in a discrete
number of intervals as to identify these regions. On the basis of this procedure,
described in Appendix D, we identi¯ed 249 women, representing 30% of the sam-
ple, for whom the propensity score lacks common support. If we now apply the
above-mentioned benchmark matching procedure on the 577 remaining women for
whom we identi¯ed a common support, we no longer have any problems in ¯nding
a speci¯cation for the score that is balanced. The estimate of ATT14 of this group
is reported in the ¯rst line of Table 4. The treatment e®ect is slightly higher than
the one obtained by the methods of the previous section. However, this result
may be biased, because it neglects a sizeable proportion of treated women. We
therefore considered the procedure of incremental matching to re-incorporate the
women outside the common support in the estimation procedure.
The second line of Table 4 reports the result of the incremental matching
procedure in which we take the sum of incremental impacts in every month between
k = ¡4 and k = 14. The advantage of this method is that the benchmark
procedure works and that we face nowhere a common support problem. The cost
is, as anticipated, a huge increase in the standard error, in°ating from 0.024 to
0.282!
In order to increase the precision, we modify the method in two respects. First,
we apply the incremental matching estimator only on the 249 women who were
outside the common support. The total ATT14 is then found by taking a weighted
33We tried speci¯cations with several higher order and interaction terms as well as ones in
which we added the time-constant explanatory variables.
22average34 of the impact of the latter group and the impact of the women within
the common support, as estimated by the direct matching method. Second, rather
than taking the sum of every monthly increment, we reduce the number of terms in
the sum by increasing the length of each increment in the sum. To determine the
length of each increment, we choose the maximal length for which the propensity
score satis¯es the balancing property without having to introduce higher order
terms or interactions of the explanatory variables. In the empirical application
this allows us to reduce the number of increments from 18 to 4. Note that the
standard error of this procedure is estimated by bootstrapping.
The third line of Table 4 reports the point estimate of ATT14 for the previously
neglected group. It is clearly lower than the point estimate for the retained group:
0.198 versus 0.272. The weighted average estimate of ATT14 for the total sample,
reported in the fourth line, is therefore slightly smaller (0.250). However, more
importantly, the standard error of this new estimate is of a reasonable magnitude
(SE = 0.033) as compared to the one obtained by the above reported incremental
matching on the total sample (SE = 0.282).
[Table 4 about here]
In the 4th column of Table 5 and Figure 4 we report the estimated ATTk from
the combined direct and incremental matching estimators for all k 2 [¡3;0] and
for k equal to 3, 6, 12 and 14. We also contrast these results with those obtained
by a "naive" before-after estimator. The latter estimator does not control for
the time-varying variables and boils down to a matching estimator in which each
woman in the "after period" is matched to herself in the "before period" (Heckman
et al., 1999). It is implemented by simply taking the di®erence between the average
outcome at k and in the the ¯rst pre-treatment month (k = ¡4).
It turns out from Figure 4 that both estimators yield very similar results. This
is because the two time-varying variables a®ect the outcome in opposite directions.
34The weights are taken to be proportional to the size of each sub-sample.
23First, during the observation period the economic conditions improve and this is
re°ected in a decrease in the local unemployment rates. On the other hand, the
cumulative unemployment duration can, by construction, never decrease. Appar-
ently, these two e®ects cancel each other out.
[Table 5 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
On the basis of these ¯ndings, we conclude that bene¯t exhaustion does signif-
icantly enhance the probability of employment: by 17.3 percentage points in the
month in which bene¯ts are withdrawn, gradually growing to 25 percentage points
14 months afterwards. Moreover, already in the month in which one is noti¯ed
the employment probability is 2.4 percentage points higher. Subsequently, the
impact jumps up from 3.6 percentage points two entitlement months before the
expiration to 15.1 percentage points one month before. This demonstrates that
anticipation e®ects are important.
4.2 A Sensitivity Analysis: Standard Propensity Score Matching
and IV
One may be suspicious of the validity of the before-after estimator since it requires
the strong identifying assumption that all systematic time-varying e®ects can be
captured by a number of observed time-varying variables. In order enhance the
credibility of the estimation result, we therefore test whether similar results could
be attained on the basis of di®erent identifying assumptions. We will consider two
alternative methods: standard propensity score matching on observed explanatory
variables and an Instrumental Variable (IV) method.
In contrast with the before-after estimator, the alternative methods are not
only based on the sampled treatment group, but also on the control group, i.e.
the group of women for whom bene¯ts did not (yet) exhaust at the survey date.
However, the sampling scheme complicates an analysis that uses both groups,
24since the sampling criteria di®er between these groups (see Section 3). Women in
the control group are selected among those who received unemployment bene¯ts
during at least one day in March 1997. In contrast, a sizeable proportion (55%)
of the treated women were not unemployed in that month. There is clearly a lack
of common support.
In order to resolve the problem, we exclude the 462 treated women who were
not unemployed in March 1997 from the analysis. This eliminates women who are
attached to the labour market. The excluded and retained treated do not di®er
very much with respect to their observed individual characteristics.35 However,
they di®er quite a lot as far as their labour market history is concerned. The ex-
cluded treated have on average a slightly lower cumulated unemployment duration
than the retained ones (respectively 52 and 56 months) but, in particular, their
last unemployment spell is shorter (respectively 19 and 36 months). The excluded
treated therefore seem to have a more volatile employment history: between Jan-
uary 1992 to March 1997 they experienced 3.3 unemployment spells on average,
whereas the retained group only 2.8. The lack of recent employment experience of
the retained women as compared to the disregarded group also shows up in Figure
5. In this ¯gure the average employment rates of the di®erent groups are plotted
between January 1997 and August 199836. The employment rate of the excluded
treatment group is much higher than the one of the retained group. The latter is
now even everywhere consistently lower than the employment rate of the control
group.
[Figure 5 about here]
A ¯rst consequence of this sample restriction is that the e®ects of bene¯t ex-
haustion prior to March 1997 are di±cult to interpret, since they are conditional
on a future event: being unemployed in March 1997. As in the treatment sample
35A description of the observed individual characteristics and the labour market histories of
the the various sub-samples is reported in Table 10 of Appendix F.
36The employment status corresponds to the one reported in the survey.
25bene¯ts expire between March and June 1997, we decided to disregard the an-
ticipation e®ects in the estimation. In this section the ATTk are therefore only
estimated for k ¸ 0.
A second consequence of this restriction is that we can no longer compare
the results obtained by the alternative methods with the ones of the before-after
estimator reported in the previous section. The comparisons reported below will
therefore refer to the before-after estimator as applied on the restricted treatment
sample.37
4.2.1 The Standard Matching Method
We ¯rst consider the standard matching method. The method consists in matching
members of the retained treatment and control sample on the basis of the control
variables reported in Table 2 of Section 3. To avoid an endogeneity bias, we
condition on the realisations of the time varying variables at the beginning of
March 1997, i.e. prior to the ¯rst bene¯t exhaustion that we observe.38
We used the benchmark procedure described in the previous section to ¯nd
a correctly speci¯ed propensity score. However, in contrast to the before-after
estimator, we applied the nearest-neighbour matching algorithm with replacement
in stead of blocking.
The results of the impact are reported in Table 6 and contrasted to the before-
after estimator as applied on the restricted sample in Figure 6. Over the whole
period, the impact is negative in a range between -11% and 0%. However, the
standard errors are large, so that we cannot reject the hypothesis that bene¯t
exhaustion has no impact on employment probabilities. On the other hand, the
before-after estimate of the impact is not contained in the 95% con¯dence inter-
37Note that on this restricted sample, we did not have any problem of common support.
Consequently, we did not have to rely on the incremental matching method, but could use direct
matching instead.
38De Lathouwer et al. (2003) condition on the income of the partner at the time of survey, after
bene¯ts have exhausted. If the partner reacts to the income loss, e.g. by increasing the number
of working hours, then the employment status of the treated women is negatively related to this
income. This induces a downward bias in the estimated impact.
26val. In the next section we will verify whether this is due to some selection on
unobservables not accounted for in the standard matching estimator.
[Table 6 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]
4.2.2 IV as a matching estimator
According to legislation UB can only be withdrawn if the cumulative unemploy-
ment duration exceeds a certain threshold. This threshold depends on the sex,
the age class and the place of residence. These rules assign recipients of UB into
an eligible and non-eligible population. Bene¯ts will not expire for all eligible
women, since there exist several grounds for lodging an appeal (see Section 2).
Nevertheless, as a consequence of these rules, the probability of UB exhaustion
jumps up, once assigned to the eligible population. We exploit this variation in
the probability of treatment to identify the e®ect of UB expiration.
The variation in the probability of treatment induced by the legislation is not
completely exogenous, however: the above-mentioned determinants of assignment
to the eligible population are not exogenous to the outcome variable, the probabil-
ity of employment. We therefore ¯rst need to purge this variation of its component
that is correlated with the employment rate. This is realised on the basis of a "Re-
gression Discontinuity Design" (see e.g. Hahn et al. (2001)). We assume that the
relationship between the employment probability and the determinants of eligi-
bility is smooth. In contrast, the relationship between these determinants and
the eligibility status is discrete: the duration must exceed a threshold and this
threshold in turn varies discontinuously as the age crosses the boundary of an in-
terval, or as the place of residence changes. Consequently, there will remain some
variation in the eligibility status once we control for its determinants by means of
continuous variables. Moreover, this variation is exogenous in that it is no longer
correlated with the outcome variable. This de¯nes an instrumental variable.
27We chose the following continuous control variables: the cumulated unemploy-
ment duration covering 63 months prior to the sampling date, as calculated from
the administrative ¯les; the age in years at the sampling date39; the female local
unemployment rate as reported in the monthly statistics of the National Unem-
ployment O±ce (RVA/ONEM). The unemployment rate was taken to eliminate
the correlation between the employment rate and the place of residence. The un-
employment duration and rate were both evaluated at the end of February 1997.
The eligibility status depends on the cumulative unemployment duration since
the ¯rst moment at which the worker became eligible to UI. However, since the
observed duration is left{censored (see section 4.1), we may underestimate it. As
to prevent a systematically incorrect assignment of the eligibility status, we ad-
just the observed duration as described in Appendix G. The eligibility status is
determined in June 1997. By this choice, we ensure that all women for whom
we observe the bene¯t exhaustion belong indeed to the eligible population: all
observed expirations occur before the end of June 1997. This choice avoids de-
termining a di®erent eligible population according to the date at which bene¯ts
exhaust. On the basis of this de¯nition we identify 632 eligible women and 118
ineligible.
The discrete nature of the outcome variable complicates the implementation
of an IV estimator. For, the Two Stage Least Squares estimator is then incon-
sistent (see e.g. Wooldridge (2002, p.478)). To avoid this problem, we follow the
suggestion of Heckman et al. (1999) and Ichimura and Taber (2001) to implement
IV as a matching estimator. This choice has the further advantage of being non-
parametric. It avoids arbitrary parametric assumptions on both the distribution
of the binary outcome and on the functional relation of the outcome with the
explanatory variables.
The eligibility status, Z is a discrete IV, conditional on the above mentioned
continuous variables, X, ¯xed at their realisations x at the end of February 1997.
39In March 1997 for the controls and between March and June 1997 for the treated women.
28Ypkt denotes the potential outcome (p = 0;1) k months after bene¯t exhaustion
at calendar time t.40 Following Heckman et al. (1999) we may write the potential
and observed outcome respectively as follows:
Ypkt = gpkt(X) + Upkt (3)
Ykt = g0kt(X) + D[¢kt(X) + U1kt ¡ U0kt] + U0kt (4)
where ¢kt(X) ´ g1kt ¡g0kt. In this notation the ATTk is de¯ned by the following
expression:
ATTk ´ E [¢kt(X) + E(U1kt ¡ U0ktjD = 1;X)jD = 1] (5)
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of XjD = 1 and, for each
k, over the four di®erent t's, corresponding to the four months - March to June
1997 - in which bene¯ts are observed to exhaust.
The next three assumptions allow us to identify ATTk by IV as a matching
estimator.
Assumption 5 E(U0ktjX;Z) = E(U0ktjX)
This is the standard IV condition that the the eligibility status may not be cor-
related with the no-treatment residual after conditioning on the above-mentioned
continuous variables, X.
Assumption 6 E(U1kt ¡ U0ktjX;Z;D = 1) = E(U1kt ¡ U0ktjX;D = 1)
This assumption implies that the average idiosyncratic impact of bene¯t ex-
haustion on the treated may not depend on the IV. In our empirical application
this assumption is not restrictive, since the IV corresponds to the eligibility status
and therefore women are by de¯nition only treated if Z = 1. In other words, there
40Since UB do not all exhaust at the same calendar time, but between March and June 1997,
we distinguish k and t.
29are "compliers" and "never-takers", but no "always-takers". As a consequence, the
Local Average Treatment E®ect (LATE) identi¯ed by the IV estimator (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994) coincides with the ATT in this empirical application.
The third assumption requires that for any X the probability of treatment
di®ers according to the realisation of the IV. Since here the IV corresponds to the
eligibility status, this assumption is trivially satis¯ed:
Assumption 7 P1(X) 6= P0(X) = 0
where Pz(X) ´ Pr(D = 1jX;Z = z) for z = 0;1.
If the above assumptions hold, then the following proposition suggests a feasi-
ble IV estimator of the ATTk:

















where the outer expectation is over the distribution of XjZ = 1 and over the t's.42.
This is a Wald{type estimator. By the above arguments, conditional on X,
the systematic di®erence in the outcome between the eligible (Z = 1) and the
ineligible (Z = 0) must be induced by the bene¯t exhaustion. Since bene¯ts do
not exhaust for every eligible woman (c.f. the conditions of appeal in Section 2),
we have to weigh this impact by the fraction, P1(X), of women among the eligible
population for whom bene¯ts e®ectively expire.
The above estimator is not operational, since it conditions on a vector of con-
tinuous variables, X: one cannot ¯nd women with both values of Z with exactly
the same realisations of X. To resolve this problem, Ichimura and Taber (2001)
generalise the result from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) obtained for standard
41see Appendix B for a proof.
42If D = 0 and Z = 1, there is no natural starting point for calendar time. We arbitrary set t
equal to March 1997 if k = 0.
30matching methods to IV matching. These authors show that, rather than condi-
tioning directly on X, one may condition on the propensity of eligibility, Q(X), in
stead. Using this result they propose to match on the propensity score of eligibility
in stead of on the propensity score of treatment. If we apply the nearest-neighbor















where Zz (z = 0;1) denotes the set of respectively ineligible (z = 0) and
eligible (z = 1) women, NZ1 the number of eligible women, ^ P1(x) is the estimated
propensity score of treatment conditional on Z = 1 , j(i) = argminj2Z0[ ^ Q(xi) ¡
^ Q(xj)]2, where ^ Q(x) is the estimated propensity score of Z = 1 conditional on
the realised explanatory variables x. Note that for Z = D this boils down to a
standard nearest-neighbor matching estimator.
We follow the benchmark procedure of Dehejia and Wahba (2002) described
above and in Appendix C to obtain a balanced speci¯cation of the estimated
propensity scores. Note, as for the standard matching method, we adjust the
proposed procedure slightly as to account for the calendar time variation t in the
outcome variable. The standard errors are calculated analytically, assuming that
the propensity scores are ¯xed. 43
We implement two variants of this IV estimator. "IV1" controls only for three
explanatory variables: the unemployment rate and duration, and the age. This set
of conditioning variables is in principle su±cient, since, by the above arguments,
all remaining variation should be random. However, if our sample were an unlucky
draw, this assumption could be violated. In "IV2" we therefore tested whether
the ¯ndings uphold if we include in the speci¯cation of the scores all the remaining
explanatory variables, i.e. those retained for the standard matching estimator.
The estimation results are reported in the last columns of Table 6 and in Figure
43see the Appendix H for a derivation of the formula.
316. For both variants they are much closer to the before-after than to the standard
matching estimates. The IV2 estimates are mostly closer to the before-after than
IV1, suggesting that some bias remains present in the IV1 estimator. However,
the IV2 estimator seems to su®er from problems of over-speci¯cation: standard
errors more than triple in magnitude! Nevertheless, despite their imprecision, the
IV estimates corroborate the ¯ndings of the before-after estimator.
5 Conclusion
This paper aimed at estimating the causal impact of UB exhaustion on the prob-
ability of employment of a speci¯c category of long-term unemployed women in
Belgium. To attain this objective we had to surmount a number of methodological
problems. Before summing up the empirical ¯ndings, we brie°y summarize the
proposed resolution to the main problems.
First, we have shown that the ful¯llment of the identifying assumptions of a
before-after estimator of a causal impact may crucially depend on the de¯nition
of the time-scale, i.e by using the number of months of bene¯t receipt prior to
the UI exhaustion date in stead of calendar time. Second, for the implementation
of the before-after estimator, we proposed a non-parametric matching method to
purge the outcome variable of time-varying determinants. As to solve a problem
of common support that was bound to occur, we developed a method that did not
require dropping any observations: the method of "incremental matching". This
method boils down to taking the sum of incremental impacts over a number of
sub-periods over the period of interest. Finally, as to overcome the inconsistency
of the IV estimator in the presence of a discrete outcome variable, we implemented
IV as a matching estimator, as suggested by Heckman et al. (1999) and Ichimura
and Taber (2001).
The reader may question why we did not analyze the e®ect of bene¯t ex-
haustion by hazard regression models, as in the literature. A ¯rst answer is that
matching estimators are non-parametric and therefore less sensitive to speci¯ca-
32tion errors44. However, the main reason is the complexity of sampling scheme
that, as mentioned above, combines a stock sample for the controls and a °ow
sample into bene¯t exhaustion for the treated women. A drawback of our choice
is that it makes it more di±cult to compare the magnitude of the estimated impact
to previous ¯ndings and to test the predictions of theory which are also phrased
in terms of hazard rates from unemployment to employment and not in terms
of employment probabilities. For instance, job search theory predicts that the
hazard rate should jump up at the moment of noti¯cation, should then gradually
increase up to the expiration date and remain constant afterwards. Note also
that the hazard from employment to non-employment should follow the reverse
pattern (up to the point at which the worker is entitled to UB again). Since the
employment probability is the sum (integral) of past hazard rates to employment
times the probability of surviving in employment up to the considered moment,
this pattern is smoothed: we should therefore observe the employment rate to
increase more gradually, to continue this upward movement beyond the moment
at which bene¯ts expire and, subsequently, to converge gradually to a higher level.
This pattern corresponds exactly to our ¯ndings.
These ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. On the basis of the before-after
estimator we conclude that in Belgium the exhaustion of unemployment bene¯ts
of long-term unemployed female workers has an important signi¯cant positive
impact on the probability of employment. From the moment at which the worker
is noti¯ed, three months before expiration, the probability of employment rises.
One month before bene¯ts expire it already attains a level that is 16 percentage
points higher than in the absence of bene¯t exhaustion and afterwards the impact
rises more gradually up to 25 percentage points 14 months after the end of the
entitlement period. If bene¯ts had not expired, the employment probabilities at
these moments would have been respectively of 2.5% and virtually zero (according
44In most cases a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) assumption is required. This can only be
relaxed if one has data on multiple spells for the same individual (Abbring and van den Berg,
2003).
33to our estimations).
The before-after estimator has been compared to both a "standard" and an
IV matching estimator, be it on a smaller sample, as a consequence of a lack
of common support between the treatment and the control sample. Even if the
IV matching estimator was imprecise, it yielded very close estimates of the ATT
to the before-after estimator on the corresponding sample. This corroborates
our ¯ndings. On the other hand, the standard matching estimator that only
corrects for selection on observables consistently yielded negative (although not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero) impact estimates and therefore performed very
badly in this empirical application.
For the interpretation of the results it is important to realise that the treatment
sample was restricted to women whose bene¯ts e®ectively expired. The impact is
therefore underestimated, since it does not take into account that women could
escape the bene¯t exhaustion by leaving unemployment for a full time job lasting
more than two years. After such an employment period workers regain entitlement
to unemployment bene¯ts and the unemployment duration clock is reset to zero.
On the other hand, the restriction of the analysis to those women whose bene¯ts
were e®ectively withdrawn necessarily implies that all employment found prior to
the moment of bene¯t exhaustion must have lasted less than two years and can
therefore be quali¯ed as "temporary".
We conclude that our ¯ndings are in the line of the more recent studies, men-
tioned in the introduction that ¯nd important disincentive e®ects of UB. How-
ever, these ¯ndings concern a very speci¯c sub-population of unemployed women
in Belgium. We do not know whether these results generalise to other unemployed
workers. Moreover, we did not evaluate the quality of the realised employment (as
measured by the wage or other employment characteristics such as the fraction
of full-time employment or of permanent contracts, etc.). This requires further
research.
34Appendix
A Employment Status before January 1997
In this appendix we describe how the outcome variable prior to January 1997
was constructed. For this period, we observe monthly the number of days of
unemployment bene¯t receipt. On the basis of this information, we propose an
estimate of the employment status such as de¯ned in the survey. To this purpose
we estimate the relationship between the administrative and survey information
during the period in which both sources are available: from January 1997 up to the
sampling date (March{June 1997). Basically, we did the following. We have chosen
a threshold number of days an individual spends in unemployment such that in
January 1997, the fraction of individuals with a number of days in unemployment
below this threshold is equal to the fraction of individuals which report themselves
as being in employment. We chose January rather than some later month, because
the number of days unemployed is a better predictor of the employment state the
more remote one is to the bene¯t exhaustion date: the closer one is to this date,
the less likely the non-receipt of UI corresponds with employment, since the worker
is more likely to become inactive or to search employment without entitlement to
bene¯ts. As a consequence, the predicted employment status overstates the one
reported in the survey, the closer one is to the expiration date (see Table 7 below).
1. Compute the fraction of individuals declaring themselves as being employed
in January 1997. Denote this fraction by fE.
2. Compute for each individual the fraction of time he has spent in unemploy-
ment (or sickness) in January 1997 (according to the administrative ¯les).
Call this fraction fU.
3. Use a logit model to predict the reported employment status in January 1997
as a function of fU, and a vector of individual attributes. Let us denote this
prediction ^ E.
4. Obtain the empirical survivor function of ^ E, S( ^ E).
5. Find the value of ^ E, such that S( ^ E) = fE. Call this fraction f¤.
6. De¯ne the employment status according to the administrative ¯les EA as
follows:
EA = 1 if f > f¤ and EA = 0 else
We computed a di®erent threshold fraction according to the sampling date (March-
June 1997). In table 7 we compare employment status as computed from the
administrative ¯les (C) to the employment status as reported in the survey (R).
The columns represent the di®erent sampling dates, and the rows represent the
months for which the two data sources overlap. By construction, the reported and
the computed status are equivalent in January 1997. In the following months the
predicted employment status is, as mentioned, always higher.
[Table 7 about here]
35B Proofs of the Propositions
Proposition 1 If Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, then:
8 k0 < k¤;8 xk¤¡1 : E[E[Yk0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk¤¡1]¡E[Yk¤¡1jD = 0;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤¡1]jD = 0] = 0
Proof By assumption 3 E[Yk0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk¤¡1] exists and by using the
de¯nition of the observed outcome Y 0
k one obtains:
E[E[Yk0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk¤¡1] ¡ E[Yk¤¡1jD = 0;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤¡1]jD = 0]
= E[E[Y0k0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk¤¡1] ¡ E[Y0k¤¡1jD = 0;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤¡1]jD = 0]
= E[E[Y0k0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk¤¡1] ¡ E[Y0k¤¡1jD = 1;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤¡1]jD = 0] by Assumption 1
= 0 by Assumption 2
Proposition 2 Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 imply that:
8 k ¸ k¤; 9 k0 < k¤ : ATTk = E[E[YkjD = 1;Xk = xk]¡E[Yk0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk]jD = 1]
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of XkjD = 1
Proof
ATTk ´ E[Y1k ¡ Y0kjD = 1]
By the law of iterated expectations and adding and subtracting terms:
ATTk = E[E[Y1kjD = 1;Xk = xk]jD = 1] ¡ E[E[Y0k0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk]jD = 1]
¡E[E[Y0kjD = 1;Xk = xk] ¡ E[Y0k0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk]jD = 1]
By Assumption 3, E[Y0k0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk] exists for each xk. Moreover, by
Assumption 1, we have E[Y0k0jD = 1;Xk = xk] = E[Y0k0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk] for all
xk. Finally, by Assumption 2 we have, E[E[Y0kjD = 1;Xk = xk] ¡ E[Y0k0jD =
1;Xk0 = xk]jD = 1] = 0. Using all this, we obtain:
ATTk = E[E[Y1kjD = 1;Xk = xk] ¡ E[Y0k0jD = 0;Xk0 = xk]jD = 1]
Since Yk = DY1k + (1 ¡ D)Y0k, we obtain:
ATTk = E[E[YkjD = 1;Xk = xk] ¡ E[Yk0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk]jD = 1]




E [E(YjjD = 1;Xj = xj) ¡ E(Yj¡1jD = 1;Xj¡1 = xj)jD = 1]+
E [E(Yk¤jD = 1;Xk¤ = xk¤) ¡ E[Yk¤¡1jD = 0;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤]jD = 1]
36Proof
ATTk ´ E[Y1k ¡ Y0kjD = 1]




j=k¤+1 E[Y1jjD = 1] ¡ E[Y1j¡1jD = 1] + E[Y1k¤jD = 1] ¡ E[Y0k¤¡1jD = 1]
+
Pk¤¡1
j=k0 E[Y0jjD = 1] ¡ E[Y0j¡1jD = 1] + E[Y0k0jD = 1] ¡ E[Y0kjD = 1]
Using the law of iterated expectations, and the Assumption 4 to ensure the exis-
tence of the conditional expectations:
ATTk =
Pk
j=k¤+1 E[E[Y1jjD = 1;Xj = xj] ¡ E[Y1j¡1jD = 1;Xj¡1 = xj]jD = 1] (1)
+E[E[Y1k¤jD = 1;Xk¤ = xk¤] ¡ E[Y0k¤¡1jD = 1;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤]jD = 1] (2)
+
Pk¤¡1
j=k0 E[E[Y0jjD = 1;Xj = xj] ¡ E[Y0j¡1jD = 1;Xj¡1 = xj]jD = 1] (3)
+E[E[Y0k0jD = 1;Xk0 = xk] ¡ E[Y0kjD = 1;Xk = xk]jD = 1] (4)
Using the fact that Yj = DY1j + (1 ¡ D)Y0j, the terms in (1) can be rewritten as
k X
j=k¤+1
E[E[YjjD = 1;Xj = xj] ¡ E[Yj¡1jD = 1;Xj¡1 = xj]jD = 1]
Using Assumption 1 together with the de¯nition of Yj, we can rewrite the terms
in (2) as
E[E[Yk¤jD = 1;Xk¤ = xk¤] ¡ E[Yk¤¡1jD = 0;Xk¤¡1 = xk¤]jD = 1]
Finally, by Assumption 3, the terms in (3) and (4) are equal to zero.

















where the outer expectation is over the distribution of XjZ = 1 and over the t's.45.




















¢(X) + E(U1kt ¡ U0ktjX;Z = z;D = 1)
P1(X)
jZ = 1;D = 1
¸
45If D = 0 and Z = 1, there is no natural starting point for calendar time. We arbitrary set t
equal to March 1997 if k = 0.
























Taking the di®erence of this expectation for z = 1 and z = 0 and Assumption 7,
i.e. P0(X) = 0, proves the Proposition.
C Dehejia and Wahba (2002) Speci¯cation Test
1. Estimate the propensity score by a Logit model, with a linear speci¯cation
of the covariates (no higher order terms or interactions)
2. Split the sample into equal-sized intervals based on the estimated propensity
score
3. Test if the mean propensity score is not di®erent for treated and controls
within each interval
4. If (3) is rejected for one or more interval, split the interval(s) into halves and
test again
5. Continue until condition (3) is satis¯ed
6. Test within each interval if the distribution of each covariate is not di®erent
among treated and controls
7. If there are signi¯cant di®erences, add some higher order terms and/or in-
teractions, and repeat steps (1) to (6)
D De¯nition of the Regions of Common Support
In this section, we will describe the method we have used to de¯ne the regions
of commun support in the estimations of section 4.1.2. The procedure consists in
the following ¯ve steps:
1. Split up the support of each of the variables in 5 equal-sized intervals;
2. To ensure balancing within each interval, test whether the mean of the vari-
able within each interval does not signi¯cantly di®er between the k = ¡4
group and the k = 14 group;
3. If the test in step 2 is rejected for some interval, split the interval in two and
go back to the beginning of step 2;
4. After convergence of this procedure, construct cells on the basis of all possible
combinations of the retained intervals of these variables;
385. Identify the region of common support by retaining only cells that contain
observations for both k = 14 and k = ¡4.
E A Method based on an Adjustment Function
In this appendix we will brie°y describe the "adjustment function estimator" sug-
gested by Heckman et al. (1999, p.1985), as well as its implementation. Consider a
deterministic function g(xk) that adjusts for the realisations xk of a random vector
Xk of time-varying variables evaluated at time k. This function can be estimated
on the basis of the pre-treatment (k < k¤) observations of the treatment sample.
The adjusted potential outcome then takes the following form:
Apk ´ Ypk ¡ g(xk) (7)
where p = 0;1. To identify ATTk , two assumptions must be satis¯ed:
Assumption 8 8k0 < k¤ : E(A0k0jD = 1) = E(A0k0jD = 0)
This assumption means that in the pre-treatment period the treatment indica-
tor may not systematically a®ect the adjusted potential no-treatment outcome.
As such, we can replace the average potential adjusted outcome of the treated
E(A0k0jD = 1) by the average observed adjusted outcome of the same women
prior to treatment E(Ak0jD = 0). Since the expectations are taken over the same
group of individuals, the assumption can only be violated if there is an unobserved
determinant of the outcome variable that systematically changes simultaneously
with the treatment status. This is very unlikely to occur in the current empirical
application.
Assumption 9 8k;k0 : E(A0kjD = 1) = E(A0k0jD = 1)
This assumption implies that the adjustment function g(Xk) captures all system-
atic time-varying factors a®ecting the employment status of the treated women.
Equivalently, the assumption implies that the distribution of unobserved factors
that are not captured by this function does not systematically vary over time. 46
Proposition 5 47 If Assumptions 8 and 9 hold then:
8k0 < k¤ : E(Ak0 ¡ Ak¤¡1jD = 0) = 0
Proof
E[Ak0 ¡ Ak¤jD = 0] = E[A0k0 ¡ A0k¤¡1jD = 0]
= E[A0k0 ¡ A0k¤¡1jD = 1] by Assumption 8
= 0 by Assumption 9
46Note that, strictly speaking, Proposition 6 below only requires that there exists at least
one k
0 in the pre-treatment period for every k in the treatment period for which the statement
in Assumption 9 is valid. However, the more restrictive formulation is required for proof of
Proposition 5.
47see Appendix B for a proof.
39If Proposition 5 cannot be statistically rejected, this provides support for the
hypothesis that the before-after estimator indeed identi¯es the causal impact of
the treatment. It is no proof, however. For instance, the true adjustment function
may change after the start of the treatment.48
The next proposition states that we can estimate the ATTk by taking the
di®erence between the average adjusted observed outcome in treatment month
k and the average adjusted observed outcome at some moment k0 in the pre-
treatment period.
Proposition 6 49 If Assumptions 8and 9 hold then:
8k ¸ k¤;9k0 < k¤ : ATTk = E(AkjD = 1) ¡ E(Ak0jD = 0)
Proof
ATTk ´ E[Y1kjD = 1] ¡ E[Y0kjD = 1]
= E[A1kjD = 1] ¡ E[A0kjD = 1]
= E[A1kjD = 1] ¡ E[A0k0jD = 1] + E[A0k0jD = 1] ¡ E[A0kjD = 1]
By Assumption 8 we have E[A0k0jD = 1] = E[A0k0jD = 0] and by Assumption
9 we have E[A0k0jD = 1] ¡ E[A0kjD = 1] = 0, which, using the de¯nition of the
observed outcome Yk, yields the desired expression.
The method just described requires the adjustment function to be correctly
speci¯ed. This can be indirectly tested on the basis of Proposition 5. However,
the power of this test is unknown. An alternative consists in estimating g(:) non-
parametrically, but this may be complicated if the number of regressors is high or
if the outcome variable is discrete, as in the present empirical application.
Implementation and Results
We estimate the linear adjustment function on the basis of a linear regression of the
outcome variable at k = ¡4 on the unemployment rate and duration (as de¯ned
in section 4.1.2) at that instant. In principle we could augment the sample by
adding the prior periods, but we did not do so as the sample is incomplete before
k = ¡4 (see Section 3).
As for the before{after estimators of section 4.1.2, we will ¯rst test the im-
plication of proposition 5: the pre-treatment (adjusted) outcomes may not di®er
over time. The ¯ndings are reported in the third column of Table 8. For conve-
nience, we have reporduced the results from section 4.1.2 (columns 5 and 6). In
all the periods tested we ¯nd negative values for ATTk. Moreover, they are rather
small. Only in two periods, the impact is statistically signi¯cant below the 5%
level (k = ¡8 and k = ¡12). Given the results from section the direct matching
estimator, this problem may be induced by a misspeci¯ed adjustment function.
[Table 8 about here]
48See Heckman and Hotz (1989) for discussion.
49see Appendix B for a proof.
40In the 4th column of table 9 we report the estimated ATTk on the basis of the
linear adjustment function for all k 2 [¡3;0] and for k equal to 3, 6, 12 and 14. We
also contrast these results with those obtained by a "naive" before-after estimator,
and those from the combined direct and incremental matching estimator. All three
estimators yielding similar results, we observe that in our empirical application
the results hardly depend on the method by which one accounts for time-varying
determinants of the outcome variable.
[Table 9 about here]
F Sample Characteristics for the IV analysis
[Table 10 about here]
G Constructing an Instrument
The IV is a binary variable indicating whether an individual has crossed the thresh-
old duration, as de¯ned by the legislation, or not. To make things more precise,
let UDi be the duration of UI receipt and let TDi be the duration for individual
i. This allows us to de¯ne the instrument as:
Zi = 1 if ±i > 0
Zi = 0 else
where ±i ´ UDi ¡ TDi. A major implication of this rule is that we must have
Zi = 1 for any treated individual. It is also crucial to realize that the reverse is not
true: for an individual from the control group, Zi can be both zero or one. Indeed,
crossing the threshold duration is a necessary condition for bene¯t exhaustion, but
not a su±cient one. Nevertheless, in our data set a problem arises. The duration of
UI receipt is only partially observed. More precisely, it is left-censored 63 months
prior to the sampling date. Letting UD0i and ±0i the observed values of UDi and
±i, we have
±0i = UD0i ¡ TDi
for some (or even all) individuals. Since UD0i · UDi, delta0i · ±i and individuals
may be incorrectly assigned. We therefore propose the following correction pro-
cedure. First, we automatically set Zi = 1 for all the treated individuals. Then,
we select the treated for which ±0i takes the correct sign (i.e. is negative). In a
second step, a regression model is speci¯ed for those individuals:
log(¡±0i) = X0
i¯ + ²i
where Xi is a set of individual characteristics, including a constant term and ¯ a
set of coe±cients to be estimated (by OLS). Next, we use the the estimated values
of ¯ to obtain the predicted value of ±0i for the whole sample:






² is the variance of the error term. With these elements in hand, the
instrument is de¯ned as follows:
Zi = 1 if UD0i + ^ ±0i > 0
Zi = 0 else
H Standard Errors for the Sensitivity Analysis
In this appendix, we will provide the formulas used to compute the standard errors
of the average treatment e®ects of the simple and IV matching estimators from
Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.1. It is convenient to ¯rst consider the ATT's for each
cohort of women separately according to the month in which bene¯ts exhaust, i.e.
between March and June 1997. The total average treatment on the treated at k
(¢k), can be written as a weighted average of cohort-speci¯c ATT's (¢kt):






where W 2 fT;Z1g, T is the set of treated observations, NWt is the number of
treated (W = T) or eligible (W = Z1) observations at calendar time t50, and
NW =
P4
t=1 NWt. In the sequel we denote the simple and IV matching estimators
respectively by superscript "S" and "IV". The simple nearest-neighbor matching
estimator, ¢S









where Tt is the set of treated women of cohort t and j(i) = argminj2C[ ^ P(xi) ¡
^ P(xj)]2, where C is the set of all control units. Now de¯ne !ij such that !ij = 1
if j = j(i) and !ij = 0 if j 6= j(i). If wjt ´
P













Consequently, the variance of ¢S















The IV nearest-neighbor matching estimator is given in Equation 6. Using the
corresponding de¯nition for wjt, we can write ¢IV





































50For each given k, there are four calendar times t, each corresponding to one of the time at
which bene¯ts exhausted plus k.
42Using the appropriate variance for the cohort-speci¯c treatment e®ect, the variance
























































Table 1: Threshold Durations for Women (in months)
Age < 36 36{45 45{50
Mean 50 60 79
St.Dev 10 11 13
Min. 30 35 45
Max 74 84 99
44Table 2: Sample Means of Explanatory Variables
Controls Treated
(N = 404) (N = 826)
Individual Characteristics
Age 35.67 32.81
Number of children in the household 1.22 1.73
Non-Belgian nationality 0.12 0.10
No diplomaa 0.38 0.24
Lower secondarya 0.27 0.31
Higher secondarya 0.29 0.33
Collegea 0.06 0.08
Labour Market History in March 1997
Cumulative Unemployment durationb 45.74 53.69
Number of unemployment spellsc 2.62 3.11
Duration of the last spelld 29.92 26.36
Last spell left censorede 0.27 0.19
Local Unemployment Ratef 0.22 0.23
All these variables come from administrative registers, with the exception
of the "number of children in the household", which was reported by the
individuals in the survey.
a
"No diploma": less than 9 years of education; "Lower secondary": at least
9 years of education; "Higher secondary": at least 12 years of education;
"College": at least 15 years of education
b
Cumulative number of months spent in unemployment 63 months prior to
the sampling date.
c
Number of uninterrupted unemployment spells during the 63 months prior
to the sampling date.
d
Duration of the last unemployment spell, ending or still ongoing in March
1997.
e
Binary variable, indicating whether the last unemployment spell was left{
censored 63 months prior to the sampling date.
f
Sub-regional unemployment rate for women as reported by the National
Administration of UI (ONEM/RVA).
45Table 3: Treatment E®ects in the Pre-Treatment Period a
k b Number of matched observations ATTk SEc
-5 825 -0.006 0.008
-6 825 0.007 0.008
-7 823 -0.003 0.009
-8 822 -0.015 0.009
-9 821 0.007 0.010
-10 820 0.000 0.010
-11 820 0.006 0.010
-12 819 -0.015 0.011
-13 814 0.007 0.009
a k =-4 is the reference
b Number of months of entitlement to UI left prior to the bene¯t
exhaustion = -k
c Bootstrapped standard error (1000 replications).
Table 4: Estimates of ATT14 using Direct and Incremental Matching Methods
treatment e®ect standard error N treated
1 direct comparison a 0.272 0.024 577
2 IATT (1) b 0.224 0.282 826
3 IATT (2) c 0.198 0.094 249
4 direct + IATT (2) d 0.250 0.033 826
a direct comparison for the individuals on the common support
b sum of incremental impacts for the whole sample
c sum of incremental impacts for the individuals out of the common support
d weighted average of (1) and (3)
Table 5: Di®erent Before-After Estimators of ATTk
k naive estimator combined direct and
incremental matching
ATTk SE a ATTk SE b
-3 0.024 0.005 0.024 0.009
-2 0.034 0.006 0.036 0.010
-1 0.149 0.012 0.151 0.013
0 0.169 0.013 0.173 0.015
3 0.186 0.014 0.190 0.016
6 0.204 0.014 0.207 0.016
12 0.225 0.015 0.208 0.033
14 0.224 0.015 0.250 0.033




b Bootstrapped standard error (1000 replications).
46Table 6: Various matching estimators for ATTk
k a Before-After b Simple Matching IV1 IV2
ATT ATT SE e ATT SE e ATT SE e
0 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.24
1 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.26
2 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.28
3 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.29
4 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.29
5 0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.29
6 0.11 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.30
7 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.32
8 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.32
9 0.13 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.32
10 0.13 -0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.33
11 0.14 -0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.34
12 0.16 -0.13 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.34
13 0.16 -0.11 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.35
14 0.16 -0.04 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.35
a Months after bene¯t exhaustion
b Direct matching applied to the restricted sample
c IV{matching using a "simple" speci¯cation (c.f. discussion in Section 4.2.2)
d IV{matching using a "complete" speci¯cation (c.f. discussion in Section 4.2.2)
e Analytical standard error (c.f. Appendix H)
Table 7: Reported vs. Predicted Employment
Status
March April Mai June
January R 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.12
P 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.12
February R 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.13
P 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.12
March R 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.13
P 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.15
April R 0.15 0.19 0.15
P 0.21 0.25 0.21





Lines: Period of overlap
R: Reported employment status
P: Predicted employment status
47Table 8: Treatment E®ects in the Pre-Treatment Period a
k b Number of matched Linear adjustment function Direct Matching
observations ATTk SEc ATTk SEc
-5 825 -0.008 0.006 -0.006 0.008
-6 825 -0.003 0.006 0.007 0.008
-7 823 -0.009 0.007 -0.003 0.009
-8 822 -0.020 0.008 -0.015 0.009
-9 821 -0.011 0.007 0.007 0.010
-10 820 -0.011 0.008 0.000 0.010
-11 820 -0.013 0.010 0.006 0.010
-12 819 -0.027 0.010 -0.015 0.011
-13 814 -0.009 0.009 0.007 0.009
a k =-4 is the reference
b Number of months of entitlement to UI left prior to the bene¯t exhaustion = -k
c Bootstrapped standard error (1000 replications).
Table 9: Di®erent Before-After Estimators of ATTk
k naive estimator linear adjustment combined direct and
function incremental matching
ATTk SE a ATTk SE b ATTk SE b
-3 0.024 0.005 0.025 0.006 0.024 0.009
-2 0.034 0.006 0.036 0.008 0.036 0.010
-1 0.149 0.012 0.152 0.012 0.151 0.013
0 0.169 0.013 0.171 0.014 0.173 0.015
3 0.186 0.014 0.192 0.014 0.190 0.016
6 0.204 0.014 0.211 0.015 0.207 0.016
12 0.225 0.015 0.236 0.016 0.208 0.033
14 0.224 0.015 0.237 0.017 0.250 0.033




b Bootstrapped standard error (1000 replications).
48Table 10: Sample characteristics of the di®erent groups
C T ET
(N = 404) (N = 362) (N = 464)
Individual Characteristics
Age 35.67 33.31 32.41
Number of children in the household 1.22 1.67 1.77
Non-Belgian nationality 0.12 0.12 0.09
No diplomaa 0.38 0.25 0.23
Lower secondarya 0.27 0.31 0.31
Higher secondarya 0.29 0.36 0.31
Collegea 0.06 0.08 0.08
Labour Market History in March 1997
Cumulative unemployment durationb 45.74 56.01 51.88
Number of unemployment spellsc 2.62 2.85 3.31
Duration of the last spelld 29.92 36.04 18.81
Last spell left censorede 0.27 0.30 0.11
Local Unemployment Rate 0.22 0.23 0.22
All these variables come from administrative registers, with the exception of the "number
of children in the household", which was reported by the individuals in the survey.
a
"No diploma": less than 9 years of education; "Lower secondary": at least 9 years of
education; "Higher secondary": at least 12 years of education; "College": at least 15
years of education
b
Cumulative number of months spent in unemployment 63 prior to the sampling date.
c
Number of uninterrupted unemployment spells in the period from January 1992 to March
1997.
d
Duration of the last unemployment spell, ending or still ongoing in March 1997.
e
Binary variable, indicating whether the last unemployment spell was left{censored 63
months prior to the sampling date.
f
Sub-regional unemployment rate for women as reported by the National Administration
of UI (ONEM/RVA).
49Figures
Figure 1: The Time Structure of the Database
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50Figure 3: The Evolution of the Employment Rate over Eligibility Duration before






























−42 −28 −14 0 14
Months of Benefit Eligibility before and after exhaustion
Eligibility Scale



















−3 −2 −1 0 3 6 12 14
Months of benefit eligibility before and after exhaustion
Propensity Score Matching Estimator Naive Estimator




































Jan97 Jul97 Jan98 Jul98
Calendar Time
treated controls excluded treated



























0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Months after benefit exhaustion
Before−After (restricted sample) Simple Matching
IV1 IV2
52References
Abbring, J. H. and G. J. van den Berg [2003], \The Non-Parametric Identi¯-
cation of Treatment E®ects in Duration Models," Econometrica, 71, 1491{1517.
Abbring, J. H., G. J. van den Berg, and J. C. van Ours [2000], \The E®ect of
Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment
to Employment," Unpublished Manuscript, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam.
Ashenfelter, O. C. [1978], \Estimating the E®ect of Training Programs on
Earnings with Longitudinal Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics,
6 (1), 47{57.
Athey, S. and G. Imbens [2002], \Identi¯cation and Inference in Nonlinear
Di®erence-In-Di®erences Models," Working Paper T0280, NBER.
Atkinson, A. B. and J. Micklewright [1991], \Unemployment Compensa-
tion and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic
Literature, XXIX, 1679{1727.
Blundell, R. and M. Costa-Dias [2002], \Alternative Approaches to Evalua-
tion in Empirical Microeconomics," Portuguese Economic Journal, 1 (2), 91{
115.
Blundell, R., M. Costa-Dias, C. Meghir, and J. Van Reenen [2001], \Eval-
uating the Employment Impact of a Mandatory Job Search Assistance Pro-
gram," Working Paper W01/20, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Bover, O., M. Arellano, and S. Bentolila [2002], \Unemployment Duration,
Bene¯t Duration and the Business Cycle," Economic Journal, 112, 223{265.
Bratberg, E. and K. Vaage [2000], \Spell Durations with Long Unemployment
Insurance Periods," Labour Economics, 7 (2), 153{180.
Card, D. and P. B. Levine [2000], \Extended Bene¯ts and the Duration of UI
Spells: Evidence from the New Jersey Extended Bene¯t Program," Journal of
Public Economics, 78 (1{2), 107{138.
Carling, K., P.-A. Edin, A. Harkman, and B. Holmlund [1996], \Unem-
ployment Duration, Unemployment Bene¯ts and Labor Market Programs in
Sweden," Journal of Public Economics, 59, 313{334.
Carling, K., B. Holmlund, and A. Vejsiu [2001], \Do Bene¯t Cuts Boost Job
Findings? Swedish Evidence from the 1990's," Economic Journal, 111, 766{790.
De Lathouwer, L., K. Bogaerts, and S. Perelman [2000], Exclusion de
l'assurance ch^ omage et r¶ einsertion sur le march¶ e du travail, Services f¶ ed¶ eraux
des a®aires scienti¯ques techniques et culturelles, Bruxelles.
De Lathouwer, L., K. Bogaerts, and K. Van den Bosch [2003], \Een
evaluatie van schorsing artikel 80 vanuit herintrede- en armoedsperpectief," in
L. De Lathouwer, B. Cockx, K. Bogaerts, J. Ries, and K. Van den
53Bosch (eds.), L'impact de la suspension article 80 dans l'assurance{ch^ omage
sur la r¶ einsertion et la pauvret¶ e, Academia Press, Gent.
Dehejia, R. H. and S. Wahba [1999], \Causal E®ects in Non-Experimental
Studies: Re-Evaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs," Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 94 (448), 1053{1062.
Dehejia, R. H. and S. Wahba [2002], \Propensity Score Matching Methods for
Non-Experimental Causal Studies," The Review of Economics and Statistics,
84, 151{161.
Devine, T. J. and N. M. Kiefer [1991], Empirical Labor Economics. The Search
Approach, Oxford University Press, New York.
Dormont, B., D. Fougµ ere, and A. Prieto [2001], \L'e®et de l'allocation
unique d¶ egressive sur la reprise de l'emploi," Economie et Statistique, 343 (3),
3{28.
Eichler, M. and M. Lechner [2002], \An Evaluation of Public Employment
Programmes in the East German State of Sachsen-Anhalt," Labour Economics,
9, 143{186.
Fredriksson, P. and B. Holmlund [2003a], \Improving Incentives in Unem-
ployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Working Paper 2003:10,
Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
Fredriksson, P. and B. Holmlund [2003b], \Optimal Unemployment Insur-
ance Design: Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?" Working Paper 2003:17,
Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
Hahn, J., P. Todd, and W. van der Klauw [2001], \Identi¯cation and Estima-
tion of Treatment E®ects by Regression Discontinuity Design," Econometrica,
63 (3), 201{209.
Ham, J. C. and S. A. Rea [1987], \Unemployment Insurance and Male Unem-
ployment Duration in Canada," Journal of Labor Economics, 5, 325{353.
Heckman, J. J. and V. J. Hotz [1989], \Choosing Among Alternative Nonex-
perimental Methods for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of
Manpower Training," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 84 (408),
862{880.
Heckman, J. J., H. Ichimura, and P. E. Todd [1997], \Matching as an Econo-
metric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Pro-
gram," Review of Economic Studies, 64, 605{654.
Heckman, J. J., H. Ichimura, and P. E. Todd [1998], \Matching as an Econo-
metric Evaluation Estimator," Review of Economic Studies, 65, 261{294.
Heckman, J. J., R. J. Lalonde, and J. A. Smith [1999], \The Economics
and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs," in O. C. Ashenfelter
and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3A, chap. 31, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1277{1366.
54Holmlund, B. [1998], \Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, 100 (1), 113{141.
Hunt, J. [1995], \The E®ect of Unemployment Compensation on Unemployment
Duration in Germany," Journal of Labor Economics, 13 (1), 88{120.
Ichimura, H. and C. Taber [2001], \Propensity Score Matching with Instru-
mental Variables," American Economic Review, 91 (2), 119{124.
Imbens, G. W. [2003], \Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment E®ects
under Exogeneity: A Review," Working Paper T0294, NBER.
Imbens, G. W. and J. D. Angrist [1994], \Identi¯cation and Estimation of
Local Average Treatment E®ects," Econometrica, 62 (2), 467{475.
Jenkins, S. P. and C. Garcia-Serrano [2000], \Re-employment Probabilities
for Spanish Men: What Role Does the Unemployment Bene¯t System play ?"
Working Paper 2000{17, ISER, University of Essex.
Jensen, P., M. Rosholm, and M. Svarer [2003], \The Response of Youth
Unemployment to Bene¯ts, Incentives, and Sanctions," European Journal of
Political Economy, 19 (2), 301{316.
Joutard, X. and M. Ruggiero [1996], \Changements de r¶ egime d'indemnisation
et transitions vers l'emploi," Revue Economique, 47 (1), 143{166.
Katz, L. F. and B. D. Meyer [1990], \The Impact of Potential Bene¯t Dura-
tion of Unemployment Bene¯ts on the Duration of Unemployment," Journal of
Public Economics, 41, 45{72.
Lalive, R., J. C. van Ours, and J. ZweimÄ uller [2002], \The E®ect of Ben-
e¯t Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment," Discussion Paper 469, IZA,
Bonn.
Lalive, R. and J. ZweimÄ uller [2002], \Bene¯t Entitlement and Unemployment
Duration: The Role of Policy Endogeneity," Discussion Paper 492, IZA, Bonn.
Layard, R., S. Nickell, and R. Jackman [1991], Unemployment: Macroeco-
nomic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lechner, M. [2001], \A Note on the Common Support Problem in Applied Evalu-
ation Studies," Discussion Paper 2001{01, Department of Economics, University
of St. Gallen.
Lindeboom, M. and J. Theeuwes [1993], \Search, Bene¯ts and Entitlement,"
Economica, 60, 327{346.
Moffit, R. [1985], \Unemployment Insurance and the Distribution of Unemploy-
ment Spells," Journal of Econometrics, 28 (1), 85{101.
Mortensen, D. T. [1977], \Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30, 505{517.
55Mortensen, D. T. [1990], \A Structural Model of Unemployment Insurance
Bene¯t E®ects on the Incidence and Duration of Unemployment," in Y. Weiss
and G. Fishelson (eds.), Advances in the Theory and Measurement of Unem-
ployment, Macmillan, Hampshire.
Pedersen, P. J. and N. Westergº ard{Nielsen [1998], \Unemployment: What
Do we Know from Longitudinal Data?" in T. Lange (ed.), Unemployment in
Theory and Practice, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Roed, K. and T. Zhang [2003], \Does Unemployment Compensation A®ect
Unemployment Duration?" Economic Journal, 113 (484), 190{206.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin [1983], \The Central Role of the Propensity
Score in Observational Studies for Causal E®ects," Biometrika, 70 (1), 41{55.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin [1984], \Reducing Bias in Observational
Studies Using Subclassi¯cation on the Propensity Score," Journal of the Amer-
ican Statistical Association, 79 (387), 516{524.
Smith, J. A. and P. E. Todd [2004], \Does Matching Overcome LaLonde's Cri-
tique of Nonexperimental Estimators," Journal of Econometrics, forthcoming.
Thoursie, A. [1998], \E®ects of Renewable Bene¯t Periods on the Exit Rate from
Unemployment," in A. Thoursie (ed.), Studies on Unemployment Duration
and on the Gender Wage Gap, no. 35 in Dissertation Series, Swedish Institute
for Social Research, Stockholm.
van den Berg, G. J. [1990], \Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory," Review of
Economic Studies, 57, 255{277.
Van den Berg, G. J., B. van der Klauw, and J. C. van Ours [2004],
\Sanctions and Transitions from Welfare," Journal of Labor Economics, 22,
211{241.
Winter-Ebmer, R. [1998], \Potential Unemployment Bene¯t Duration and Spell
Length: Lessons from a Quasi-Experiment in Austria," Oxford Bulletin of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 60 (1), 33{45.
Wooldridge, J. M. [2002], Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Wurzel, E. [1990], \Staggered Entry and Uneployment Durations: an Applica-
tion to German Data," in J. Hartog, G. Ridder, and J. Theeuwes (eds.),
Panel Data and Labor Market Studies, North{Holland, Amsterdam.
56